

LNCS 2736

**14th International Conference, DEXA 2003  
Prague, Czech Republic, September 2003  
Proceedings**

**DEXA 2003**



Springer

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Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek  
Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;  
detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at <<http://dnb.ddb.de>>.

CR Subject Classification (1998): H.2, H.4, H.3, H.5, I.2, J.1

ISSN 0302-9743

ISBN 3-540-40806-1 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg New York

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Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg New York  
a member of BertelsmannSpringer Science+Business Media GmbH

<http://www.springer.de>

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Printed in Germany

Typesetting: Camera-ready by author, data conversion by PTP-Berlin GmbH  
Printed on acid-free paper SPIN 10929148 06/3142 5 4 3 2 1 0

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## Preface

The 14th DEXA 2003 International Conference on Database and Expert Systems Applications was held during September 1-5, 2003 at the Czech Technical University in Prague, Czech Republic. The DEXA line of conferences has already gained its own reputation and respected position as a platform for the exchange of ideas among theoreticians and practitioners in the wider area of computer science, but mainly in the areas of database and knowledge-based technologies.

Since DEXA 1993, which was held in Prague, DEXA has grown into a multiconference consisting of four more focused and specialized conferences besides DEXA itself, namely the DaWak conference, EC-Web conference, eGOV conference, and this year happening for the first time, the HoloMAS conference. In addition, the DEXA workshop is a special event offering enough space for specialized discussion, and acting – in a certain sense – as an incubator for new conferences.

The DEXA conference itself is growing in volume and quality each year. This time there were 236 papers submitted and reviewed and the program committee selected 91 of the best papers to be included in this volume. Each of the submitted papers was carefully reviewed by at least three independent PC members or external reviewers.

The DEXA proceedings quite clearly reflect the current trends in the database area and we are happy with the balanced content of both the conference and the proceedings.

We would like to express our thanks at this point to all the institutions that actively supported this event, namely:

- Czech Technical University, Prague, Czech Republic
- DEXA Association, Linz, Austria
- FAW, Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria
- Austrian Computer Society
- Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK
- The Gerstner Lab, as part of the EU Center of Excellence MIRACLE at the Czech Technical University, Prague, Czech Republic

We would also like to thank the whole DEXA implementation team, especially the PC members and the reviewers who did a wonderful job in preparing the technical content of the conference. Special thanks go to Prof. Roland R. Wagner and Prof. A Min Tjoa, who remain persistently the main driving forces behind the DEXA line of events, and also to Gabriela Wagner, who dedicated all her efforts to the success of the DEXA event.

Prag, Linz  
June 2003

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## Policy I

### 1 Introd

For effective sources to information and use different intelligent agents to adapt the changes automatically correlating events can be taken

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# Designing Secure Databases for OLS\*

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**Abstract.** Some Database Management Systems (DBMS) allow to implement multilevel databases, but there are no methodologies for designing these databases. Security must be considered as a fundamental requirement in Information Systems (IS) development, and has to be taken into account at all stages of the development. We propose a methodology for designing secure databases, which allows to design and implement secure databases considering constraints regarding sensitive information from the requirements phase. The models and languages included in the methodology provide tools to specify constraints and to classify the information into different security levels and to specify which roles users need to play to access information. The methodology prescribes rules to specify the database and the security information with the Oracle9i Label Security (OLS) DBMS. It also has been applied in an actual case by the Data Processing Center of the Ciudad Real Provincial Government.

## 1 Introduction

The modern society forces companies and enterprises to evolve, and to manage information properly in order to achieve their objectives and survive in the digital era. Organizations depend increasingly on IS, which rely upon large databases, and these databases need increasingly more quality and security. Indeed the very survival of the organization depends on the correct management, security and confidentiality of this information [1].

Databases are present in many situations of our real life, managing and storing a huge amount of important information. So, it is important to protect databases and IS [2]. Sometimes, databases also store information regarding private or personal aspects of individuals, like identification data, medical data or even religious beliefs, ideologies, or sexual tendencies. Because of this, there are laws to protect the individual privacy (e.g., *Spanish Constitutional Law for the Personal Data Protection*

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\* This research is part of the DOLMEN project (TIC2000-1673-C06-06) and RETISSI project (TIC2001-5023-E) supported by the Research Projects Subdirection of the Ministry of Science and Technology.

(LOPD)<sup>1</sup> - [3]). Failure to comply with these laws used to be very strict, enforcing severe penalties. That information should then be equipped with mechanisms that prevent non-authorized access, fulfilling the existing Data Protection Laws.

As some authors remarked [5, 6], we think that database protection is a serious requirement which must be considered carefully, not as an isolated aspect, but as an element present in all stages of the database life cycle, from the requirement analysis to implementation and maintenance. For this purpose, different ideas for integrating security in the system development process are proposed [7], but they only considered database security from a cryptographic point of view. Chung et al. also insist on integrating security requirements in the design, by providing the designers with models specifying security aspects, but they do not deal with database specific issues [8].

There are a few proposals that try to integrate security into conceptual modeling such as the Semantic Data Model for Security [9] and the Multilevel Object Modeling Technique [10], but they have not been very spread. One more recent proposal is UMLSec [11] where UML is extended to develop secure systems. This approach is very interesting, but it -again- only deals with IS in general, whilst conceptual and logical database design, and secure database implementation are not considered. Moreover Castano et al. presents a very interesting methodological approach for designing security in databases, but it does not consider the integration with the database development process [12]. Also, traditional database methodologies, do not consider security in their proposals [13, 14].

To overcome this problem, we propose a methodological approach, which allows us to design databases taking into consideration security aspects from the earliest stages, until the end of the development. This approach could also be an extension of the existing methodologies and modeling standards, since the organizations who are really interested in database security would not have to make a great effort to adapt to a new methodology. The methodology we proposed extends different UML models and the Object Constraint Language (OCL). It allows us to create conceptual and logical model of multilevel databases, and to implement them by using Oracle 9i Label Security [15].

In order to develop the methodology, we have used the 'Action Research' method [16], applying the methodology to the redesign of a database for the Ciudad Real Provincial Government (Spain). This database was managed by an application, called SALA (System for the Accounting of the Local Administration), that had different confidentiality problems, which we have solved through a new secure design. The general aim of this application is to control the budget and the accounting of the Provincial Government. This application manages not only economic information about companies and individuals, but also *personal information of individuals*. If minimal security measures are taken into account, someone could illegally explore economic and personal information, by collecting addresses, account numbers, telephone numbers, information about economic transactions, etc. It is possible to know the habits of companies and individuals, and therefore to get a profile of them. In this case the organization would have to face up to legal responsibilities.

<sup>1</sup> LOPD is an adaptation of the European Union Directive 95/46/CE of the European Parliament and Council about people protection regarding the personal data management and the free circulation of these data [4].

In the next section we present an overview of the secure database design methodology, including the models and languages that have been defined. Finally in section 3 we comment conclusions and future work.

## 2 Methodology Overview

This methodology allows us to classify the information according to its confidentiality properties and to which user roles will have access permissions. It is also possible to specify security constraints on that classification. The methodology ends defining rules to specify the database, the security information and the security constraints with OLS.

The methodology be iterative and incremental, driven by use cases, and centered on the architecture. The stages of the methodology are *Requirements Gathering*, *System Analysis*, *Multilevel Relational Logical Design*, and *Specific Logical Design*.

In order to give support to the methodology, we have extended Rational Rose, to include and manage the security information of the elements into the use case and class diagrams. It also permits definition of security constraints and their lexical and syntactical checking.

In the following sections, we present each stage in more detail, illustrating them with a portion of the case study.

### 2.1 Requirements Gathering

As in any other development methodology, the goal of this stage is to collect and represent requirements, with the particularity that we also have to consider security requirements. The most important artifact of this stage is the *extended use case model*, which allows us to indicate special security characteristics of actors and use case through stereotypes. The extended use case model introduces the concept of *secure use case* and *authorized actor*. A secure use case is a use case that should be deeply studied from the point of view of security. An authorized actor is an actor that must have special authorizations in order to execute a particular use case.

This stages consists of the following activities: Gathering initial requirements, creating the business model and the system glossary, looking for actors, looking for use cases, looking for persistent elements, describing use cases, analyzing security in actors and in use cases, defining priorities in use cases, structuring the use case model, looking for relationships between use cases, and reviewing use cases.

For space reasons it is not possible to develop in detail the extended use case model. More details can be found in [17].

### 2.2 System Analysis

The aim of this stage is to build the database conceptual model, considering all the requirements that have been collected in the previous activities. The conceptual model will be composed of the *extended class diagram*, and a set of *security constraints* that are expressed through the OSCL language [18].

The extended class diagram makes possible to specify security information in classes, attributes and associations, which indicates the conditions that the subjects have to fulfill to access them, regarding *security levels* and *roles of authorized users*. If one security level, for instance, is assigned to a class, it means that subjects have to be classified in at least the same level in order to access the information. If a set of roles is assigned to an element, it means that the subjects have to play at least one of those roles to access the element.

The OSCL language allows the specification of security constraints that define the information about security of classes, attributes or associations, depending on a particular condition. For instance, in the following example:

**Context** CreditorOfTheExpenseBudget **inv:**

self.SL=if Refunds <= 3000 then U else if Refunds <= 10000 then S else T

The constraint specifies that the security level of the objects belonging to the class *CreditorOfTheExpenseBudget* will be more restrictive if the value of the attribute *Refunds* have one particular value. As we can see the syntax of OSCL is easy to understand, because this language is based on the well-known OCL.




Fig. 1. Roles Hierarchy

The activities of this stage are architecture analysis, use case analysis, classes analysis, security analysis, and package analysis. All of these activities are composed of many more tasks. The components of the security analysis activity are as follows:

- Defining the valid security levels for the system.
- Assigning security levels to the classes, attributes and associations, taking into account the security properties of the information, and the *inherent constraints*<sup>2</sup> of the extended class model.
- Classifying classes, attributes and associations into different authorized user roles, if necessary.
- Specifying security constraints, which define the security information of different model elements.
- Analyzing other kinds of security constraints (not only about confidentiality).

<sup>2</sup> The extended class model has different inherent constraints that all instances must fulfill. For example, the security level of the attributes should be equal to or more restricted than the security level of the class to they belong.

- Defining the authorization information of the users, which is composed of the security level and the roles that users play.

Part of the hierarchy of roles that has been defined for the case study database is shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 illustrates an example of an extended class diagram. The security levels<sup>3</sup> that have been defined for this database are Unclassified (U), Confidential (C), Secret (S), and Top Secret (T). For each role, a short name is also defined, which is used in the diagrams. For instance, the class 'EconomicalData' has defined the security level 'T' and the role 'OAC' (Account Area Operator). This means that the information of the objects that belongs to that class will only be accessible to users who have security level 'Top Secret' and who play role 'Account Area Operator'. If there is no security information associated to a class, then all users can access it.




Fig. 2. Third Parties Class Diagram

We can also observe in Figure 2 three OSCL constraints, which define the security level of the objects, depending on the value of different attributes. For instance, the security constraint associated with class 'BankingData' indicates that the security level of its objects will be 'Secret' if the value of the attribute 'BankDescription' is equal to 'Non-Spanish Bank', and 'Unclassified', in any other case.

### 2.3 Multilevel Relational Logical Design

This stage is the bridge between the conceptual model and the implementation with a specific logical model. We think it is very important to keep the independence

<sup>3</sup> In this methodology it is possible to define a particular set of security levels, depending on the complexity of the database.



between a "general logical model" and the different specific logical models because multilevel and other authorization issues vary considerably from one product to another. For the moment we have considered only a general relational security database model because relational databases are the most used and widespread at present [19], but it could be possible to develop secure object-relational or object oriented databases.

The three components of the general multilevel relational model are:

- Database relational model: This component includes the definition of each relation of the database, considering the necessary attributes for representing the confidentiality information
- Meta-information of the model: Each relation has associated a meta-information tuple, which includes the data type of the attributes, and the valid values of the attributes related to security information of the tuple and attributes.
- Security Constraints: All the security constraints defined in the conceptual model are specified in this model without losing or modifying their semantics.

The activities of this stage deal with the transformation of all elements in the extended class diagram into the multilevel relational model.




Fig. 3. Multilevel Relational Model

A fragment of the multilevel relational model of our example can be seen in Figure 3. For space reasons, we have selected only a subset of the classes of the class diagram. We can observe that each class appears in the relational model and in the metainformation section, and the constraint section includes the security constraints related to the considered classes. Obviously, we have done a translation of the data types used in the conceptual model into logical data types.

## 2.4 Specific Logical Design

In this stage we specify the secure database in a particular logical model: Oracle Label Security (OLS). We have chosen this model because it is part of one of the most important database management systems, that allows the implementation of label-based databases; and because the organization wanted to support the new database in this DBMS.

In the context of OLS, a security policy is the most important element, and includes different parameters, such as valid security levels, groups and compartments, and different options that define the way of managing the security. Taking that into account, the activities of this stage are as follows: Defining the database model (all the tables), defining the security policy and their default options, defining the security information in the security policy, creating the authorized users and assigning their authorizations, defining security information for tables through labeling functions, implementing security constraints through labeling functions and access control predicates, and finally, if necessary, implementing operations and controlling their security.

```
CREATE_POLICY('SecurityPolicy','SecurityLabel','HIDE,CHECK_CONTROL,
READ_CONTROL,WRITE_CONTROL')

CREATE_LEVEL('SecurityPolicy',1000,'U','Unclassify')
CREATE_LEVEL('SecurityPolicy',2000,'C','Confidential')
CREATE_LEVEL('SecurityPolicy',3000,'S','Secret')
CREATE_LEVEL('SecurityPolicy',4000,'T','Top Secret')

CREATE_GROUP('SecurityPolicy',1,'L','LocalGovernmentEmployee')
CREATE_GROUP('SecurityPolicy',2,'O','Operator','L')
CREATE_GROUP('SecurityPolicy',3,'SY','SystemAdministrator','L')
CREATE_GROUP('SecurityPolicy',4,'S','SuperUser','SA')
CREATE_GROUP('SecurityPolicy',5,'A','NormalAdministrator','SA')
CREATE_GROUP('SecurityPolicy',6,'SR','SecurityResponsible','SA')
CREATE_GROUP('SecurityPolicy',7,'E','Experienced','O')
CREATE_GROUP('SecurityPolicy',8,'NE','Non-Experienced','O')
CREATE_GROUP('SecurityPolicy',9,'AAO','AccountAreaOperator','E')
CREATE_GROUP('SecurityPolicy',10,'PAO','PersonnelAreaOperator','E')
CREATE_GROUP('SecurityPolicy',11,'OAC','AdministrativeAreaOperator','E')
```

Fig. 4. Security Policy, Levels and Groups Definition

In Figure 4, we show the way of defining the security policy, the security levels and the user groups in OLS. 'SecurityLabel' is the name of the column that stores the sensitive information in each table, which is associated with the security policy. The option 'HIDE' indicates that the column 'SecurityLabel' will be hidden, so that users will not be able to see it in the tables. The option 'CHECK\_CONTROL' forces the system to check that when a subject introduces or modifies a row, the user has reading access. The option 'READ\_CONTROL' applies a policy read enforcement for select, update and delete operations. Finally, the option 'WRITE\_CONTROL' applies policy write enforcement for insert, delete and update operations.

When a new security level is defined, we have to specify the name of the policy, a number -which indicates the order of the levels-, a short name, and the name of the security level. Also, when a new group is created, we have to specify the name of the policy, the number of the group, a short name, the name of the group, and the short name of its father in the hierarchy.

```

SET_LEVELS('SecurityPolicy', 'User1', 'T', 'S', 'S')
SET_GROUPS('SecurityPolicy', 'User1', 'O', 'O', 'O')
SET_USER_PRIVS('SecurityPolicy', 'User1', 'FULL, WRITEUP, WRITEDOWN, WRITEACROSS')

```

Fig. 5. User definition

Once the security policy, the levels and groups have been defined, we can identify the users in the system, and assign them privileges if necessary. In Figure 5 the user 'User 1' is defined with the following information: Max security level 'T', default security level 'S', minimum security level 'S', read access groups 'Operator', write access groups 'Operator', and default groups 'Operator'. Since it is not usual to assign special privileges to users, we show how this is possible. The description of all the possible options can be seen in [15].

```

CREATE FUNCTION Function1 (BankDescription: VarChar) Return LBACSYS.LBAC_LABEL
As MyLabel varchar2(80);
Begin
  If BankDescription='Non-Spanish bank' then MyLabel := 'S::AAO,OAC'; else MyLabel := 'U::OAA,OAC';
end if;
Return TO_LBAC_DATA_LABEL('SecurityPolicy', MyLabel);
End;
CREATE FUNCTION Function2() Return LBACSYS.LBAC_LABEL
As MyLabel varchar2(80);
Begin
  MyLabel := 'T::O';
  Return TO_LBAC_DATA_LABEL('SecurePolicy', MyLabel);
End;
CREATE FUNCTION Function3(Refunds: Real) Return LBACSYS.LBAC_LABEL
As MyLabel varchar2(80);
Begin
  If Refunds <=3000 the MyLabel := 'U::O';
  else if Refunds <= 10000 then MyLabel := 'S::O'; else MyLabel := 'T::O';
  end if;
end if;
Return TO_LBAC_DATA_LABEL('SecurityPolicy', MyLabel);
End;

APPLY_TABLE_POLICY ('SecurityPolicy', 'BankingData', 'Scheme', , 'Function1')
APPLY_TABLE_POLICY ('SecurityPolicy', 'LaterFinancialYearsCreditorAndDefaulter', 'Scheme', ,
'Function2')
APPLY_TABLE_POLICY ('SecurityPolicy', 'CreditorOfTheExpenseBudget', 'Scheme', , 'Function3')

```

Fig. 6. Labeling Functions

The way of assigning security information to the row, once they are inserted, is through labeling functions. When there are no security constraints associated with a table, the labeling function always assigns the same security information to the row. The security constraints are also implemented by the labeling function. Figure 6 shows three labeling functions, and the command by which they are assigned to the tables, which are associated with the relations that have been defined in Figure 3. 'Function1' creates the security information, depending on the value of the column 'BankDescription'. 'Function2' always creates the same security information, and finally, 'Function3' creates the security information depending on the value of the column 'Refunds'. These functions are associated with tables; therefore it is possible to reuse the same labeling function for several tables.

### 3 Conclusions

The criticality of IS, and specially databases for modern business, together with new requirements of laws and governments, make necessary more sophisticated approaches to ensure database security.

Traditionally, information security deals with different research topics, like access control techniques, cryptographic methods, etc. Although all these topics are very important, we think that it is fundamental to use a methodological approach, where security-at different levels- is taken into consideration at all stages of the database development process. In this paper we have summarized a methodology, which extends the most accepted modeling languages, process models, constraint languages and security models in the industrial and research community. The methodology has been refined and proved in the design of a secure database in a Spanish local government, solving its confidentiality problems. We have also developed a CASE tool to automatically support the management of use case and class diagrams and OSCL security constraints.

There are several interesting directions in which we are extending the proposal presented in this paper: It could be interesting to improve and extend the languages and techniques involved in this methodology, for example, to consider new kinds of security constraints, such as temporal, integrity or availability constraints [20]. We are also improving the gathering requirements stage in order to reuse legal requirements [21].

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